Authors. Hilary Kornblith Naturalizing Meaning Through Epistemology: Some Critical Notes. Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd Ed. Edited by Hilary Kornblith. Naturalizing Epistemology: Quine, Simon and the Prospects for Pragmatism. Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd Ed. Edited by Hilary Kornblith. In defense of a naturalized epistemology. Hilary Kornblith. In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. pp.
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The discussion to follow describes some of kornblithh dominant claims, commitments, and forms that naturalistic epistemology, so understood, has taken, and specific examples of such naturalistic views. And still the point is normative, warning us against telepaths and soothsayers. Against this general background, many theorists adopt a more or less naturalistic approach to the subject matter—focusing on particular features of the actual epistemic situation and drawing from a diverse range of areas of empirical study psychology, gender studies, sociological and historical studies, and others.
Naturalism in Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
According to this picture, to be rational is to reason in accordance with principles of reasoning that are based on rules of logic, probability theory and so forth. On a reliabilist view, the legitimacy of the relevant principles of reasoning—what makes them good principles—is a function of whether they are, in fact, reliable. Added to PP index Total downloads 57, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 15 32, of 2, How can I increase my downloads?
Husserl, Edmund,Logische Untersuchungen.
More generally, questions might be raised about the underlying assumption that responding to the skeptic in such a way as to not beg any questions is an achievable end to begin with, and so something that deserves as much attention as it has traditionally been afforded.
Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd Ed.
Naturalization of epistemology does not jettison the normative and settle for the indiscriminate description krnblith ongoing procedures. Epistemology thus considers a logical substitute rather than real processes. Granted, Quine claims that skeptical arguments inevitably trade on the fact of illusions, which would seem to make other appeals to common sense fair game.
But it seems that nothing in epistemology as Quine conceives of it affords us the resources for evaluating such arguments:. Luiz Henrique de A. In the same way, Kornblith thinks, nafuralizing seemingly spontaneous judgments about whether this or that actual or hypothetical case constitutes an instance of knowledge is an a posteriori judgment, backed by our already-acquired knowledge of the relevant worldly epistemic phenomenon.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. One obvious response is that this begs the question. Pagination of in-text citations follows that of the reprint, where page numbers for the latter are given below. After all, so long as our actual epistemic concepts and evaluations are broadly reliabilist—so long as.
Qilin Li – manuscript. Some retain truth as the primary epistemic goal; others propose some non-traditional goal. Moreover, there is the concern that such constraints, if consistently applied, would be rarely if ever be satisfied. What emerges here is that the epistemologist would need some prior method for choosing the right extra-mental phenomenon.
Ann Garry – – Hypatia 10 3: It has a particular nature, and a particular causal-explanatory role in our general understanding of the life and success of certain types of biological organisms. Papineau, David,Philosophical NaturalismOxford: The assumption that epistemology trades in normative matters, and not just description cand an abiding concern with skepticism dfor example, can be seen in much epistemology from Descartes through to the present.
Just as in NE, however, others e. It can appear to be such only because philosophical investigation, at least in its initial stage, has as its target the empirical examination of nautralizing concepts. Academic Tools How to cite this entry. Epistemic agents cannot and ought not be faulted on episteology grounds that they did not follow epistemic strategies which are not cognitively possible for them. This entry has no external links.
There is no single feminist epistemology. University of Minnesota Press.
Naturalism in Epistemology
Wolfgang Spohn – unknown. For present purposes, it suffices to note that it shares many features with the debate within and about NE. Naturalizing Meaning Through Epistemology: Find it on Scholar. In better understanding that place, and through an empirical investigation of kornbith various mechanisms of belief production and retention, we may determine where we are most in need of guidance, and what steps can be taken, given our capabilities, to overcome our shortcomings.
According to others, such results, together with a psychologically realistic view of how human reasoning actually proceeds, point up the need to revise standard views of what rationality involves. Harvey Siegel – – Philosophy of Science 47 2: Cambridge University Press, pp. Grandy – – Synthese 70 February: Pollock, and Pollock and Cruzseek to understand epistemic justification in terms of conformity to procedural nauralizing of belief-formation, the correctness of which is ensured by the contents of the relevant concepts.
Find it on Scholar. In terms of a – d above, meta-epistemic NE would constitute a denial of the autonomy of epistemology bat least as regards its fundamental ontology. Selby-Bigge, 2 nd ed. Likely, Kornblith says, our concept of knowledge is defective in various ways anyway. Berit Brogaard – forthcoming – In Abrol Fairweather ed. Cruz,Contemporary Theories of Knowledge2 nd ed.
But it also illustrates the above-mentioned shift, characteristic of NE, away from perfectly general questions about the nature and possibility of knowledge to understanding human knowledge, given the facts of our powers and situation: Also worth noting here are naturaljzing pair of more strictly meta-epistemological desiderata Goldman announces at the start of the same paper.
While epistemology thus has no distinctive methodthere is a sense, Kornblith thinks, in which it retains its autonomy:. This is a prime specimen of naturalized epistemology, for it is a finding of natural science itself, however fallible, that our information about the world comes only through the impact of our sensory receptors. In none of this was the goal to be faithful to actual psychology.